m1 m4


N. 33 (2017)

Maurizio Candiotto

Deduzione trascendentale e critica della ragione.
Diritti dell’intelletto, diritto della ragione

PP. 259-284

1. Elenchos, p. 259; 2. Deductio et deducendum, p. 262; 3. Phaenomena, p. 266; 4. Funzione regolativa e fallibilità. Ragione e intelletto, p. 269; 5. Deductio ipsa ratio, p. 271; 6. Pensare il possibile senza pensare alla mente, p. 275; 7. La riflessione e la sua critica, p. 280.

Transcendental deduction and Critique of reason.
Rights of the intellect, rights of the reason

The transcendental deduction in the
Critique of Pure Reason is – far beyond the mere analysis of a historical datum such the modern mathematical science of nature – a strong, skeptic-reistant argument. In order to justify the claim of validity raised for our aprioric knowledge, i.e. for the aprioric and universal element that is present in our empirical knowledge (vs. mere perception), the critical philosopher must address the very conditions of thought. Kant turns from his initial question ‘How is it possible to know? How is knowledge legitimate?’ to the even deeper question ‘How is it possible to think? How can thinking be performed at all?’. This can be seen in the text of the first edition (1781), where subjective deduction results into an objective deduction by virtue of its own achievement; however, the result of that inquiry is handed down to the very second-edition transcendental deduction (1787) and there lingers. A synoptic reading of the two editions is therefore needed and is here attempted.

Keywords: Critique of Pure Reason; Transcendental Argument; Skeptic-resistant; Reason/Understanding; Thought/Knowledge.


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